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1Abstract
In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law.
We develop a model of international military conﬂict where the con-
ﬂicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These
sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international po-
litical market for sanctions, where diﬀerent countries trade political
inﬂuence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly
positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacer-
bate the military conﬂict, not reduce it. We then propose an alter-
native interpretation to the perceived lack of eﬀectiveness of interna-
tional sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of
undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.
Keywords: conﬂict management, international sanctions, arms embargo, in-
ternational political market, pressure groups.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D74, K33
21 Introduction
There has been a long debate in the political and economic literature on
the merits of imposing economic or military sanctions on countries violating
certain rules governing international behavior. The goal of these sanctions is
to produce in the target country a desired political change. However, some
scholars have put forth the view that sanctions can be ineﬀective or even
counterproductive - see e.g. Pape (1997). Their arguments have included
the perverse political responses in the target country to the perceived ‘un-
warranted’ third party interference represented by international sanctions,
such as exacerbated nationalism or xenophobic behavior - a ‘rally round the
ﬂag’ type of behavior - or the likely punishment of innocent individuals in
the target country who are not responsible for their government’s policy -
see White (1994) for a survey of these arguments.
In the context of a military conﬂict between two countries subject to
sanctions imposed by third parties, our paper explores the eﬀectiveness of
sanctioning within a game theoretic model where sanctions are not taken ex-
ogenously but generated endogenously. We show that the level of sanctions
in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanc-
tions would exacerbate the military conﬂict, not reduce it. This result comes
from the interaction between all players in the international political market,
and constitutes an alternative explanation to the two types of arguments
discussed above.1
Our starting point is the observation that individuals in local jurisdic-
tions, with the possible exception of legislators and judges, perceive their
ability to actually inﬂuence the law under which their acts will be judged to
be very small. Suppose an individual subject to a particular judicial system
considers whether or not to commit an act which the law deﬁnes as crimi-
nal (plausibly, because it produces a negative externality). By committing
this act the individual becomes a criminal and, as such, faces some expected
punishment. How high such expected punishment is depends on the judicial
system the individual is subject to, e.g., whether it is a common law system or
3a civil code system. Of course an individual may not be detected, he may not
get convicted, he may even bribe his way out. However, under a minimally
functioning judicial system, in terms of lost utility, his expected punishment
will be strictly positive, and the punishment imposed is independent of the
individual in question: the law is by deﬁnition general.
In contrast, when considering the international public law governing inter-
national relations, countries perceive that they have some ability to actually
inﬂuence both its design as well as its enforcement. For example, a coun-
try committing an act of war might violate international law and will face a
given expected punishment. However, depending on the extent to which its
allies and enemies can exert power in the international arena, and depending
on the economic, military and political interests aﬀected by both the act of
war and its punishment, it may well be the case that an international agency
such as the UN is unable to enforce the rules governing international rela-
tions in this speciﬁc case. One can even regard the expected punishment
as dependent on the country in question, and as being insigniﬁcant in many
instances.2
Finally, we should note that the situation analyzed in our paper, where
two conﬂicting parties invest resources in weaponry so as to defend their
own endowment of productive capacity and possibly appropriate the other’s,
being then be subject to sanctions imposed by third parties, is somewhat
diﬀerent from a situation of ‘anarchy’ in international relations as deﬁned
and analyzed by Hirshleifer (1995a, 1995b).
Even though we recognize the role that a ‘rally around the ﬂag’ eﬀect can
have in reducing the eﬀectiveness of sanctions, we propose in our paper an
alternative explanation for such reduced eﬀectiveness. Our explanation has to
do with a ‘buy allies’ eﬀect in the international political market, according to
which a target country tries to buy opposition to the imposition of sanctions
by making use of its role as an importer of weapons from at least some of the
very same third countries that would carry out the imposition of sanctions.
The paper goes as follows: the basic model is introduced in section 2,
4and the political market for sanctions is discussed in section 3. Section 4
concludes the paper with some ﬁnal remarks.
2 Modeling Conﬂict and Third Party Inter-
vention
Our paper brings together two strands in the economics literature: the theory
on conﬂict and rent-seeking and the theory on economic sanctions.
Firstly, Hirshleifer’s 1988 seminal paper on the economic analysis of con-
ﬂict studies the allocation of resources among appropriative and productive
activities in an economy. Both Hirshleifer (1988, 1989, 1991a) and Garﬁnkel
(1990) study diﬀerent conﬂict technologies and their implications for an econ-
omy’s resource allocation. Grossman and Kim (1995) develop a general equi-
librium model to analyze the allocation of resources among appropriative and
productive activities by two conﬂicting economic agents where the technol-
ogy of conﬂict explicitly considers defensive and oﬀensive activities. However,
the strategic relation between the two conﬂicting parties is self-contained: by
ignoring the rest of the world their model cannot deal with third party inter-
ventions such as conﬂict mediation and the possible imposition of sanctions
as we do in this paper. Neary (1997) develops a game theoretical model of
a two-player society where only armed self-enforcement of property rights is
possible. However, and similarly to Grossman and Kim (1995), the strategic
relation between the two conﬂicting parties is self-contained, hence ignor-
ing third party interventions and their possible uselfulness in reducing the
likelihood of conﬂict.
Secondly, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988, 1989) and Leidy (1989) present
a public choice view of international economic sanctions. Based on Becker’s
theory of pressure groups (see Becker, 1983 and 1985), they construct a
game between conﬂicting interest groups within both sending countries and
target countries to determine the nature and level of sanctions. However,
theirs is not an analysis of conﬂict between diﬀerent parties ﬁghting for some
5prize, who have to choose between investment in arms and investment in
civilian productive capacity. It is solely an analysis of international economic
sanctions in response to a conﬂict taken as given. Similarly, Eaton and
Engers (1992) present a multi-stage game theoretic model of sanctions, where
the players are the sender and the target of sanctions. They examine the
potential for sanctions to elicit from the target of sanctions behavior deemed
desirable by the sender. Theirs is a paper solely on sanctions, where the only
interaction analyzed is the one between sender and target, and they ignore
the public-goods issues raised by the existence of multiple senders; they also
ignore the issues that arise when distinct groups within a sender country
have conﬂicting interests.
We develop a model similar to the one in Grossman and Kim (1995).
Each country acts as a self-interested economic agent who invests a given
endowment on oﬀensive or predatory activities, on defensive activities, and
on directly productive activities. We assume that investments on oﬀensive
activities by at least one country might lead to conﬂict. We call this conﬂict
war, but it may be seen generally as a bargaining game with strictly positive
transaction costs.3The UN, and international public law, aim at reducing
these transaction costs by threatening to impose sanctions on countries which
engage in oﬀensive activities. In other words, aggressive policies are punished
by supranational institutions such as the UN.
Following Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), we assume that the level of
sanctions imposed on target countries is determined in a political market for
sanctions where third countries, e.g. the countries represented in the UN,
trade political inﬂuence. We show that a lower sanctions could be more
eﬀective in reducing transaction costs. This result comes from the interac-
tion between players in the international political market, so that a higher
sanction can exacerbate the military conﬂict, not reduce it.4
62.1 The war game played by the conﬂicting parties
In this section we construct a general model that tries to capture a situation
where international property rights over resources are entirely deﬁned by
international public law, and where there exists a supranational agency that
enforces them. Alternatively, we can interpret international public law as
a system of behavioral norms or shared ethical beliefs performing the same
function as international property rights.
A non-cooperative game is played by the political representatives of two
countries a and b. Each country i = a;b is endowed with a ﬁnite resource
!i > 0, and decides on the division of !i between investment in civilian
productive capacity ei  0 and in military unproductive capacity mi  0.
Capacity ei is used to produce ﬁnal consumption goods according to some
technology to be speciﬁed later. Investment mi can be either of an oﬀensive
type, denoted by oi  0, or of a defensive type, denoted by di  0. Hence,
!i  ei +di +oi. This dichotomy of military expenditures has been justiﬁed
in the literature.5
After these investments have been made, each country decides whether
to engage in predation using its oﬀensive weapons. Military expenditures
are unproductive in that they are not inputs into the production of ﬁnal
consumption goods. However, because they can be used to defend one’s
capacity ei or appropriate the other country’s capacity ej, they can be seen
as indirectly productive investment. In Grossman and Kim (1995), player i
can appropriate the other player’s entire endowment !j, regardless of how it
has been allocated. Hence, both defensive and oﬀensive military investments
can be appropriated alongside with a country’s civilian productive capacity.
Alternatively, we can argue that, in a world where predatory activities take
place only once, as it is the case in our model, there is no beneﬁt in using
up resources to appropriate military capacity belonging to one’s opponent,
since there will be no opportunity to use them. Nevertheless, in this general
model we allow for any of these two cases.
The proportion of its own capacity that country i is able to retain, be it
7its total endowment !i or its civilian productive capacity ei only, is a function
pi of investments di and oj. Furthermore, the proportion of country j’s own
capacity that country i is able to appropriate is a function qi of investments
dj and oi. For i;j = a;b and i 6= j we assume that:
(1) pi(di;0) = 1 for all di  0; pi(0;oj) = 0 for all oj > 0;















(3) qi(0;oi) = 1 for all oi > 0; qi(dj;0) = 0 for all dj  0;
(4) 0  pi(di;oj) + qj(di;oj)  1.
All these assumptions are self-explanatory. The last two inequalities in
condition (2) state that one’s own investments in defensive and in oﬀensive
weapons exhibit decreasing returns. The second inequality in condition (4)
can be interpreted as saying that predation can be destructive. In this case it
would be illustrative to interpret predation as a form of exchange with trans-
action costs higher than in trade, i.e., in fully voluntary exchange. Functions
pi and qi, i = a;b, deﬁne what is known as a technology of conﬂict.
For any given proﬁle ((di;oi);(dj;oj)), the value pi(di;oj) can be inter-
preted either as the proportion of country i’s capacity retained by country i,
or the (discrete case) probability that country i will retain its capacity, with
(1  pi) denoting then the probability of country i retaining zero capacity.
Similarly, the value qi(dj;oi) can be interpreted either as the proportion of
country j’s capacity appropriated by country i, or the (discrete case) prob-
ability that country i will appropriate country j’s capacity, with (1  qi)
denoting the probability of country i appropriating none of country j’s ca-
pacity. The probabilistic interpretation allows one to view the outcome of a
conﬂict between diﬀerent parties as uncertain - see Skaperdas (1991) - but
under this interpretation pi(di;oj)+qj(di;oj)  1. Under the other interpre-
tation, proportions pi and qi, i = a;b, could be regarded as the outcome of
some negotiation process between the two countries which takes into account
their relative military strengths.
8Both countries might be the target of sanctions imposed by third coun-
tries. We assume that the level of sanctions is a monotonically increasing
function Zi : < ! < of the investment level oi in oﬀensive weapons made by
country i. In particular, we will assume that sanctions take the form of a
per unit tax zi > 0 on the level of investment oi. Then, Zi(oi) = zi  oi. In
the context of our model it is natural to assume that sanctions target only
investments in oﬀensive weapons. Investments in defensive weapons are not
regarded as jeopardizing peace. Sanction policy Zi is public information.
In addition, we envision a split in country i’s population between ‘doves’
and ‘hawks’. This split tries to capture in a simple way the diﬀerence in
preferences towards international relations between ‘paciﬁsts’ and ‘expan-
sionists’ within a country. It will allow us to study the impact of a change in
country i’s foreign policy, brought about by a change in the relative degrees
of political inﬂuence exerted by doves and hawks, on the equilibrium invest-
ment levels di, oi, and dj, oj and, hence, on the distribution of resources in
equilibrium.
We assume all doves in country i have an identical preference relation
dove
i over the set of proﬁles ((ei;di;oi);(ej;dj;oj)) such that they care ex-
clusively about the preservation of their own country’s productive capacity.
Similarly, we assume all hawks have an identical preference relation hawk
i
over that same set of proﬁles. However, hawks are assumed to care as much
about the preservation of their own country’s productive capacity as appro-
priating the other country’s productive capacity in that they regard both as
perfect substitutes. Hence, a dove in country i ranks as his top alternative
the complete preservation of his country’s own productive capacity regard-
less of the proportion of country j’s productive capacity country i manages
to appropriate. It follows that, between investments di and oi, a dove only
cares about di.
We assume that doves and hawks exert political inﬂuence over their coun-
try’s political decision-makers through the normal political process, such
as periodical elections for the legislative, or executive, branches, as well as
9through other channels such as political lobbying. In this paper we will not
make a distinction between these two types of political inﬂuence; the two
groups are simply said to behave as political pressure groups in that they
invest resources in steering the political decision-making process to work in
their favor, be it through the vote or through less formalized political means.
In eﬀect, competition for political inﬂuence does not usually result in all-or-
nothing outcomes where one group, e.g. the winning majority in an election,
clearly wins and another group clearly loses. Political inﬂuence can be ex-
tended well beyond the formal political process, be it the ballot box or not.
Hence, even a minority group can be successful when attempting to inﬂuence
in their favor the political decision-making process. It follows that even the
preferences of a minority group might be reﬂected on the decision-maker’s
preferences.
Following Becker (1983, 1985), we assume that the degree of political
inﬂuence exerted by each pressure group, doves or hawks, depends on its own
size and on the size of the other group, on the amount of resources spent per
each group member, and on other variables which will remain unspeciﬁed.
Let Id
i and Ih
i denote the degrees of political inﬂuence exerted by doves












j 6= 0. Then, 0  Ii  1, and the degree of relative political
inﬂuence exerted by hawks equals (1  Ii).
For each given degree Ii, country i’s political representative has a prefer-
ence relation i over the set of proﬁles ((ei;di;oi);(ej;dj;oj)), reﬂecting the
degree of political inﬂuence exerted by doves and hawks in the population,
and represented by a continuous and bounded utility function Ui. We will
abuse notation and will let Ui denote also i’s utility function where Ii is taken
as a parameter. Assume that function Ui is in C2, and that:
(5)
@Ui
@ei > 0 for all 0  Ii  1;
(6)
@Ui
@ej = 0 for Ii = 1, and
@Ui





@ej for all 0 < Ii  1;
10(8)
@2Ui
@ej@Ii < 0 for all 0  Ii  1;
(9) the Hessian matrix H(di;oi) of second order partial derivatives of Ui with
respect to di and oi is negative deﬁnite everywhere in its domain.










@di > 0, and
@Bi
@zi > 0, for all ei;oi;di;zi;!i  0.
Given oi, di and !i, and parameter zi, ei is uniquely determined. Both
countries play a Cournot duopoly game, with country i’s strategy space being
given by Ai  Oi  Di  Ei = f(oi;di;ei) 2 <
3
+ : Bi  0g, and with Ui being




subject to Bi(ei;oi;di;zi;!i)  0 and (ej;dj;oj) taken as given.
Clearly, Ai is a non-empty, convex and compact subset of the Euclidean
space <3
+. Since by assumption the hessian matrix H(di;oi) is negative deﬁnite,
by the implicit function theorem one can derive country i’s best-response
functions dBR
i , and oBR
i . In addition, since function Ui is continuous in the
space (Ai  Aj), by a well-known theorem in game theory6the above game
has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
2.2 An example: arms embargo
In this next example we follow the literature by assuming that pi(di;oj) 
di
di+oj, where   0 is a parameter measuring the eﬀectiveness of oﬀensive
weapons against defensive ones. Ceteris paribus, the higher is  the more
eﬀective are the opponent’s oﬀensive weapons against country i’s defensive
weapons and, hence, the lower is the proportion of productive capacity that
country i will be able to retain after a conﬂict. On the other hand, if  = 0
then country j’s oﬀensive weapons are powerless against country i’s defenses
and, hence, country i will be able to retain its entire capacity after a conﬂict,
i.e., pi(di;oj)  1 and qj(di;oj)  0. Furthermore, we assume that qj(di;oj) =
11(1)(1pi(di;oj)), where 0    1 so as to capture the idea that predation
can be destructive and, hence, lead to a deadweight loss - see assumption (4)
in the previous section. The higher is  the more destructive is predation. It
follows that qj(di;oj) 
(1)oj
di+oj . These two functions are examples of contest
success functions in ratio form as deﬁned in Hirshleifer (1989) in the context
of rent-seeking competition between two diﬀerent parties. Henceforth, let
  (1  ).
Given an investment level ei in civilian productive capacity, a constant
returns to scale technology enables the production of consumables in the
amount (  ei), where  > 0 is a productivity parameter assumed common
to both countries. We assume that the output of consumables is not appro-
priable, i.e., subject to predation, by the other country. However, country
i’s civilian productive capacity as well as its defensive and oﬀensive weapons
are subject to appropriation by the other country.
In the absence of sanctions, country i faces a budget constraint given by:
Bi = ei + di + oi  !i  0. For a ﬁxed level of endowment !i this constraint
deﬁnes i’s action space Ai, over which i maximizes the following functional
Ui, which is assumed linear in ei;!i, and !j:
Ui((di;oi;ei);(dj;oj;ej);Ii;!i;!j)= ei + pi(di;oj)  !i + qi(dj;oi)  (1  Ii)  !j
We are assuming that the marginal value for country i of one unit of
country j’s endowment appropriated by the former equals the degree of rela-
tive political inﬂuence exerted by hawks in i. This value varies between zero
and one.
Finally, given assumption (5) above, we know that a solution to country
i’s optimization problem will satisfy the budget constraint Bi  0 with equal-
ity. Hence, for each given proﬁle (ej;dj;oj), country i’s optimization problem
can be rewritten as a maximization problem over the space of proﬁles (di;oi).
In many instances where international sanctions have been imposed on
countries engaged in a military conﬂict, these sanctions took the form of an
12embargo on the exports of weaponry to these countries - as examples we
point out the cases of Bosnia and Angola. In this paper we will assume that
an arms embargo cover only oﬀensive weapons. International sanctions are
interpreted here as a policy instrument aimed at discouraging investments
in oﬀensive weapons, whether or not war between the conﬂicting parties will
actually break out. The imposition of an arms embargo leads to a rise in
the cost of oﬀensive weapons for the country targeted by sanctions. In order
to make this assumption consistent with our previous view of each country’s
investments, we can interpret oi as the fraction of the initial endowment
!i country i apportions to the purchase of oﬀensive weapons either from
domestic producers or from abroad.
Assume then that an arms embargo imposed on country i implies that, for
an investment oi in oﬀensive weapons, the fraction of the initial endowment
!i country i will have to apportion to the purchase of oﬀensive weapons will
be (1 + zi)  oi. Country i’s problem can then be written as:
max
di;oi
Ui((di;oi;ei);(dj;oj;ej);Ii;!i;!j)=   ei + pi(di;oj)  !i + qi(dj;oi)  (1  Ii)  !j
subject to ei = !i  di  (1 + zi)  oi.












 !j  (1  Ii)  (1 + zi)   = 0.
Second order suﬃcient conditions for a maximum are also satisﬁed. In
fact, function Ui is strictly concave in the space of proﬁles (di;oi), for all
dj;oj > 0. Hence, the above (local) maximum is unique.
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2 (2)
with i = a;b. Furthermore, eNE
i = !i  (1 + zi)  oNE
i  dNE




















ambiguous. Hence, we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 An increase in the arms embargo rate zi targeting country
i will lead to a decrease in the equilibrium level of investment oNE
i in oﬀen-
sive weapons, but will have no eﬀect on the equilibrium level of investment
dNE
i in defensive weapons or on the equilibrium level of investment oNE
j in
oﬀensive weapons by the other country. Furthermore, it will have an am-
biguous eﬀect on country j’s equilibrium level of investment dNE
j in defensive
weapons, on country i’s equilibrium level of civil capacity eNE
i and on country
j’s equilibrium level of civil capacity eNE
j .
Proof: The unambiguous eﬀects result immediately from the Cournot-Nash
solution. As for the ambiguous eﬀects one can easily show that the sign of
@dNE
j







@zi is the sign of the term (1 + zi)  (1  Ii)  .QED
Proposition 1 tells us that the imposition of an arms embargo on coun-
try i is always eﬀective in that it always leads to a reduction on country
i’s equilibrium level of investment in oﬀensive weapons, but it leaves the
equilibrium level of investment in defensive weapons unchanged, since in this
example both investments are independent - note that the second order cross
derivative is zero. However, the eﬀect on the equilibrium level of investment
in productive capacity is ambiguous since there are two partial eﬀects moving
in opposite directions. An increase in the cost of oﬀensive weapons due to the
imposition of an embargo results, ceteris paribus, in less endowment being
invested in productive capacity. On the other hand the level of investment in
oﬀensive weapons decreases, releasing endowment for investment in produc-
tive capacity. Which eﬀect dominates depends on the relation between zi, Ii
14and  represented by the term (1+zi)(1Ii). The ﬁrst eﬀect will tend
to dominate the second one when the sanction rate zi is small, the degree Ii
of relative political inﬂuence exerted by doves is small, and the technology
parameter  is large. And since   (1), this means that  is larger the
less destructive is predation and the higher is the eﬀectiveness of oﬀensive
weapons against defensive ones.
The eﬀect of an increase in zi on country j’s equilibrium investment in
defensive weapons is also ambiguous. From the ﬁrst-order condition it is
clear that it depends on the marginal probability
@pj
@dj which may increase
or decrease with oi. Country j’s investment in defensive weapons is more
likely to decrease if the sanction zi is large, the degree Ii of relative political
inﬂuence exerted by doves is large, and the technology parameter  is small.
Finally, notice that an increase in the endowment level !j increases the
equilibrium level of investment oNE
i , since it increases its value at the margin
relative to the investment ei. An increase in !j also leads to an increase
in dj such that the ﬁnal eﬀect on proportion pj is null, i.e., in equilibrium
@pj
@!j = 0. In other words, a wealthier country is as vulnerable to endowment
appropriation as a poorer one, which means that the so-called “paradox of
power” as deﬁned in Hirshleifer (1991b) does not occur.
The next two propositions refer to the eﬀect of a change in the degree Ii
on the diﬀerent equilibrium investments levels in both countries.
Proposition 2 An increase in the degree Ii of relative political inﬂuence
exerted by doves in country i results in a decrease in the equilibrium level
of investment oNE
i in oﬀensive weapons and an increase in the equilibrium
level of civil capacity eNE
i , but will have no eﬀect on the equilibrium level of
investment dNE
i in defensive weapons or on the equilibrium level of investment
oNE
j in oﬀensive weapons by the other country. Furthermore, it will have
an ambiguous eﬀect on country j’s equilibrium level of investment dNE
j in
defensive weapons and equilibrium level of civilian productive capacity eNE
j .
Proof: The unambiguous eﬀects result immediately from the Cournot-Nash




15sign of the term (1  Ii)    (1 + zi), and the sign of
@eNE
j
@Ii is the sign of the
term (1 + zi)  (1  Ii)  .QED
Note the similarity between an increase in the arms embargo rate zi and
an increase in the degree Ii of relative political inﬂuence exerted by doves in
country i. There is just one diﬀerence, namely that an increase in the degree
Ii always induces more investment in productive capacity, while the same is
not true with an arms embargo.
Proposition 1 and 2 show that an increased sanctions rate zi and a larger
degree Ii of relative political inﬂuence exerted by doves in country i will
have similar eﬀects on the equilibrium levels of investment in both oﬀensive
and defensive weapons in both countries. Hence, the promotion of education
and other social policies aimed at increasing the proportion of doves in the
population can be regarded as an alternative, and eﬀective, conﬂict deterrent
to the imposition of an arms embargo on conﬂicting countries.
Proposition 3 An increase in the degree Ii of relative political inﬂuence ex-
erted by doves in country i will result in a decrease in country j’s equilibrium
level of investment dj in defensive weapons if and only if
1+zi
1Ii > . Simi-
larly, an increase in the arms embargo rate zi targeting country i will result
in a decrease in country j’s equilibrium level of investment dj in defensive
weapons if and only if
1+zi
1Ii > . Moreover,
1+zi
1Ii >  if and only if pNE
j > 1=2.


















This proposition gives some content to the ambiguous result derived be-
fore. Consider the impact of an increased arms embargo rate zi on country
j’s investment in defensive weapons. One could be tempted to argue that,
given that the enemy is investing less in oﬀensive weapons, country j would
invest less in defense and more in productive activities. However it may also
be the case that it is now more attractive to invest in securing !j because










zi % ! & ? ? ! ? ! ?
Ii % ! & % ? ! ? ! %
!i % % ! ! ! % & ! !
it is cheaper to do so. Hence, spending more in securing !j and less in pro-
ductive activities can be optimal. From Proposition 3, we know that the
ﬁrst argument applies if pNE
j > 1=2, whereas the second argument applies if
pNE
j < 1=2.
Table 1 summarizes the three propositions discussed before. An upward
slopped arrow means an increase, a downwards slopped arrow means a de-
crease, an horizontal slopped arrow means no change, and a question mark
means an ambiguous result.
In this example it is clear that sanctions are always a deterrent to in-
vesting in oﬀensive weapons and, hence, they behave as a conﬂict deterrent.
Moreover, as zi ! 1, i.e., as the arms embargo becomes tougher, the equi-
librium level of investment in oﬀensive weapons tends to zero, i.e., oNE
i ! 0.
This summarizes the argument for the imposition of arms embargoes. In the
next section we attempt to show that this argument is na¨ ıve.
3 The international political market
The public choice approach to international organizations has been typically
characterized by a constitutional or social contract view under which the
underlying players are regarded as sovereign, but where their individual self-
interested behavior leads to a Pareto ineﬃcient outcome. Military and trade
wars can be regarded as international public bads in that they impose neg-
ative externalities. There is no world authority that can eﬀectively control
the behavior of countries in their selﬁsh pursuit of their own interests. A
Pareto-optimal outcome can only come about by a certain degree of consen-
17sus among nations - for a survey of these arguments see Frey (1997).
Our view is that the constitutional contract is in reality the outcome
of a bargaining process in which countries act to further their own selﬁsh
interests. This contract is not necessarily Pareto eﬃcient. We show that the
problem is not the contract in itself - sanctions were always eﬀective in the
previous section - but, instead, the bargaining process resulting in a ‘trade
of political inﬂuence’.
The level of sanctions imposed on countries a and b are seen as an equi-
librium outcome of an international political game played by a large group of
countries. This political game is modeled as a political market for sanctions
as in Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), where diﬀerent countries, possibly
having diﬀerent (social) preferences over the imposition of sanctions, ‘trade
political inﬂuence’. This point of view will regard international organizations
such as the UN as embodying a political market for sanctions. Even though
we recognize that diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent degrees of inﬂuence within
the UN - in particular, in the UN Security Council the ﬁve permanent mem-
bers have a veto power over some issues - at this stage of the analysis we
will assume that all countries behave as perfect competitors in the market
for political inﬂuence. An alternative approach would recognize that a small
group of countries behave very much like a group of dominant ﬁrms (or as
oligopolists), with smaller countries behaving like a competitive fringe. Note
that even in this case the qualitative results presented in the paper will hold.7
As for choosing countries as our units of analysis, i.e., as individual self-
interested economic agents, possibly a more realistic alternative viewpoint
would recognize that within each country there are pressure groups with dif-
ferent preferences over the imposition of sanctions on target countries. A
useful dichotomy would distinguish between ‘interventionists’ and ‘isolation-
ists’. For example, this dichotomy applies easily to the USA before, if not
during, their involvement in the two world wars.
One way of justifying this dichotomy is to recognize that sanctions might
serve the interests of some (pressure) groups and run counter the interests
18of other (pressure) groups, within each sending country. For example, we
could regard interventionists as domestic producers that will beneﬁt from
the imposition of sanctions taking the form of a ban on imports from the
target countries, and isolationists as domestic producers that will be hurt
by the imposition of sanctions which take the form of a ban on exports to
the target countries as in Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988). In any case,
our approach can encompass this viewpoint by directly including all pressure
groups from all diﬀerent countries in the international political market for
sanctions instead of viewing individual countries as our ‘units of analysis’.
Following Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), let there be N diﬀerent coun-
tries divided in two diﬀerent groups, G1 and G2, with N1 and N2 = (N 
N1) members. All countries in G1 beneﬁt from the imposition of sanctions
whereas all countries in G2 lose. Let zi 2 <+ measure the per unit level of
sanctions imposed on country i as a response to any strictly positive inves-
ment level oi, with i = a;b. For every given level of sanctions zi 2 <+, each
country k in G1 is willing to pay some price pk;i(z) for an additional unit of
sanctions imposed on country i. Then,
X
k2G1
pk;i(zi) for all zi 2 <+ deﬁnes an
aggregate inverse demand function P1;i : <+ ! <+ for additional sanctions,
where P1;i(zi) > 0 for all zi 2 <+. Similarly, given every level of sanctions




pm;i(zi) deﬁnes an aggregate inverse demand function
P2;i : <+ ! <+ for less sanctions, where P2;i(zi) > 0 for all zi 2 <+. We fur-
ther assume that @P1;i=@zi < 0 and @P2;i=@zi > 0 for all zi 2 <+. These two
functions deﬁne a political market for sanctions; if an equilibrium (P 
i ;z
i)
exists it is clearly unique, and z
i deﬁnes the level of sanctions that will be
imposed on country i as a result of her investment oi, i = a;b. We will
assume for now that the two international political markets are independent.
Figure 1 here
We take the view that the price pk;i(z) each country k in G1 is willing to
pay for an additional unit of sanctions does not necessarily equal the sum, be
19it over all individual citizens or over all groups of citizens, of the prices, posi-
tive or negative, at which each member values an additional unit of sanctions.
Rather, it is an average of all those diﬀerent prices weighted by the degree of
political eﬀectiveness each member (e.g. each pressure group) is able to com-
mand when exerting inﬂuence over the country’s political representatives.
Therefore, even though the imposition of sanctions, by restricting free trade
between the sending countries and the target countries, will create a dead-
weight loss for all senders taken together, it does not follow that the losers,
i.e., countries in group G2, will be able to buy out countries in group G1 and
avoid the imposition of sanctions altogether (see Kaempfer and Lowenberg
(1988), following Becker’s work on pressure groups and inﬂuence functions).
This assumption can be interpreted as saying that the ‘invisible hand’ does
not work for the case of interaction between pressure groups. Finally, we
will continue to assume that pi(di;oj) 
di
di+oj and that qi(dj;oi) 
oi
dj+oi,
where     0.
3.1 Trade in Weapons
For the case of an arms embargo being imposed on countries a and b, assume
that group G2 comprises the countries exporting weapons to a and b. Hence,
it is reasonable to assume that countries in G2 will be hurt by the imposition
of economic sanctions which, directly (as in the case of arms embargoes) or
indirectly, will aﬀect their exports of weaponry. It follows they are willing to
pay a price to prevent the imposition of sanctions. This price is assumed to
increase with an increase in the level of per unit sanctions zi. Moreover, the
greater is the pre-embargo volume of weapons exported to both conﬂicting
countries by the members of G2 the higher is the price the latter are willing
to pay to prevent the imposition of per unit sanctions zi - see van Bergeijk
(1989).
On the other hand, by investing in oﬀensive weapons, country i will try
to ‘buy allies’ in the international political market. We model this eﬀect by
assuming that there exists a continuous mapping oi
 7! P
oi
2;i, with (oi) > 0 for
20all oi  0, where P
oi
2;i : <+ ! <+ denotes the (redeﬁned) aggregate demand
function for less sanctions by group G2. Hence, for each level of investment oi
and for each level of sanctions zi, P
oi
2;i(zi) denotes the maximum price group
G2 as a whole is willing to pay for one less unit of sanctions imposed on
country i. An increase in oi leads to an upward shift of the “demand” curve
P2;i to P 0
2;i, whereas a decrease in oi leads to a downward shift of this same
“demand” curve - see ﬁgure 1.
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Under the assumptions made before, a second order suﬃcient condition
for a unique maximum is satisﬁed. In this case oNE
i is usually larger than









zi = i, for i = a;b and where i is some positive constant.









[1 + zj(1  j)](1  Ij)!i






[1 + zi(1  i) + (1  Ii)]
2 (4)
for i = a;b. It then follows that eNE
i = !i  (1 + zi(oNE
i ))  oNE
i  dNE
i .
21Comparing (2) and (4), it is clear that as long as i > 0, i.e., as long
as some trading takes place in the political market, an arms embargo will
be less eﬀective than what the na¨ ıve view claims - see proposition 1. When
i > 1, one should not impose an arms embargo at all because it creates
an overshooting of investment in oﬀensive weapons, hence exacerbating the
conﬂict. The next proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 4 In the presence of an international political market, an in-
crease in the arms embargo rate zi targeting country i will lead to the same
qualitative eﬀects as in proposition 1, but these eﬀects will be smaller. How-
ever, if i > 1 then an increase in the arms embargo rate zi targeting country
i will lead to an increase in country i’s equilibrium level of investment oNE
i
in oﬀensive weapons.
Proof: Obvious from an examination of the Nash equilibrium above, and
from its comparison with the Nash equilibrium from section 2.2.QED
4 Final remarks
In this paper, we have extended the current economic theory of conﬂict and
anarchy to a situation where property rights exist, can be enforced, but
are subject to a previous bargaining game between the lawbreakers and the
enforcers. We have developed the argument that the existence of these sanc-
tions can exacerbate the conﬂict because both parties use their resources to
‘buy’ the enforcers.
A related question is how to measure the success and failure of interna-
tional sanctions. In his 1989 paper, van Bergeijk concludes that the probabil-
ity that an economic sanction succeeds is higher the larger is the pre-sanction
trade linkage (between target country and sender country(ies)), the more un-
stable the target’s political situation and the shorter the sanction period. The
results support the idea that prolonged duration of a sanction decreases its
eﬃcacy. His investigation answers aﬃrmatively to the question of whether
22economic sanctions can be eﬀective instruments in international politics - see
also Diehl et. al. (1996).
We have taken the view that sanctions aim at reducing investment in ag-
gressive activities or predation. The argument for limited sanctions has been
constructed assessing the eﬀectiveness of sanctions as conﬂict deterrents. An
alternative view would be to argue that sanctions aim at inducing the substi-
tution of investment in aggressive activities by investment in civil productive
capacity. The model shows that if that is the aim, an education and social
policy aiming at increasing the proportion of doves (those who do not like
war) in a given country is more eﬀective than a sanctioning policy. This
suggests some support to the recent proposals of investing more in UNESCO
and similar organizations rather than UN military forces.
A ﬁnal aspect is the motivation of those acting in the political market:
we have built the argument assuming that the preferences of national gov-
ernments coincide with the preferences of the national delegates in the UN
General Assembly. There has been some literature on the importance of
these delegates’ preferences - see Eaton and Engers (1992), Kaufman and
Duncan (1992), and Frey (1997). The conclusions of our model can allow
for diﬀerences on preferences: as long as we accept that the UN delegates
engage on some trade of political inﬂuence where their votes can be bought,
the model goes through.
Complementing recent literature by Downs, Rocke and Barsoon (1996)
and Abbot and Snidal (1998), our paper suggests that the ineﬀectiveness
of international sanctions is not necessarily due to an alleged (or perceived)
under-policing but can be the consequence of over-policing and related avoid-
ance activities.
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Endnotes
[1] In support of the ﬁrst argument, Pape (1997) mentions Iraq - or the Iraqi
regime - as an illustrative example of a target of sanctions which has, at least
until now, shown a remarkable degree of endurance against what have been
the most extreme package of sanctions ever have applied to a country in recent
history. As an example supporting the latter argument it is often pointed out
that the economic recession that apartheid and early post-apartheid South-
Africa underwent due, at least partially, to the desinvestment that followed
the imposition of international economic sanctions during the apartheid days,
was especially harmful to more vulnerable economically, i.e., to the same
people that were discriminated against by the apartheid regime. Also for a
discussion of the South-African case see Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1986).
[2] Examples: Indonesian occupation of East-Timor versus Iraqi occupation
of Kuwait; the 1997 Turkish invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan; Angola, Rwanda
and Burundi support to Kabila’s rebels in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of
Congo) versus South-African support to UNITA rebels in Angola. According
to The Economist - see its November 16th, 1996 issue - Zairian rebels were
boosted by the imposition of international sanctions on Burundi’s military
regime. According to this newspaper, these sanctions induced the Burundi’s
government to do nothing about guerrilla inﬁltration along the Zairian bor-
ders.
[3] We realize that investments in predation do not necessarily lead to war.
26Brito and Intriligator (1984, 1985), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1988),
and Fearon (1995) argue that investment in predation activities may deter
actual predation: whether or not such investments will lead to war will typi-
cally depend on factors such as the player’s beliefs about each other’s military
strength, their relative strength, and possibly many other factors one could
subsume in a random term. A review of the literature can be found in O’Neill
(1994).
[4] For example, on its 30th March 1996 issue, The Economist argued that
the UN arms embargo in Bosnia exacerbated the conﬂict: both sides started
bombing UN peacekeepers to endanger soldiers’ lives and force them to go.
[5] We are fully aware of the controversy surrounding such distinction between
oﬀensive and defensive weapons. See Glaser and Kauﬀman (1998) for a
review of the so-called Oﬀense-Defense theory.
[6] Debreu-Glicksberg-Fan Theorem.
[7] There are many options in modeling how decisions are taken in the UN.
Some stylized facts can be observed: ﬁrst, it is usually a majority rule; second,
within this majority rule the size of the majority may vary according to the
importance of the issue but it is usually a simply majority rule; in the General
Assembly, we observe one vote per country.
27